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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20070323-CA

v.
STEVE WALLACE CARTER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of use of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with prior convictions, a
second degree felony (R. 97). This Court has jurisdiction over
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e)(West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Where defendant wrote to the court that he was satisfied

with his counsel's representation and later agreed he wanted to
proceed with sentencing, can he now argue on appeal that the
court should have further considered his early complaints about
his counsel's representation?
When an error is invited, no standard of review applies.

2. Where defendant was represented by counsel, did the trial
court err by declining to address his pro se motion to withdraw
his plea?
Whether a court must consider a represented defendant's pro
se pleadings presents a question of law, reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Petty, 2001 UT App 396, 1 4, 38 P.3d 998.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
dispositive in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with one count each of
possession or use of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a
third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). After several amendments to the
information, he was ultimately charged with possession or use of
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with priors, a first
degree felony, and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free
zone with priors, a class A misdemeanor (R. 102-03).

He entered

a guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) with priors, a second degree felony
(R. 97, 121-23).

A year later, the court sentenced him to one-

to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 186). This timely
appeal followed (R. 198).

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The prosecutor recited the facts most succinctly at the
change of plea hearing:
On December 15th, 2004, the defendant was at
437 Binford, apartment number 6, when
officers went over to the location. Officers
found drugs in the bathroom where the
defendant had come from. . . . Officer Mahon
talked to the defendant. The defendant
admitted that he had used drugs the night
before, methamphetamine, specifically.
Methamphetamine was what was tested positive
in the two baggies and in the two meth pipes
that were located. There was also a syringe
located in the defendant's backpack. The
defendant admitted that he had used the
syringe at some point to inject the
methamphetamine as well.
R. 211: 10.

Following this recitation, the court asked

defendant, "[I]s that what happened?"

Defendant replied, "That's

exactly what happened" (Id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by not inquiring into his early complaints about his attorney.
Defendant, however, invited the error of which he now complains.
While defendant did complain about his attorney, those complaints
were followed by a letter in which he expressed satisfaction with
his counsel's judgment.

Moreover, he explicitly agreed to

proceed with sentencing, thus further signaling to the court that
any previous concerns had been satisfactorily resolved.

He

cannot now reverse his position and fault the court for not

3

investigating the very complaints he led the court to believe had
been resolved.
Even assuming arguendo that the court should have made
further efforts to determine the merits of defendant's early
complaints, any error was harmless.

Defense counsel represented

defendant in precisely the way he requested.

Defendant has

failed to establish either that his counsel should have been
replaced or that he would have enjoyed a better outcome absent
his counsel's representation.

His claim, therefore, fails.

Defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion
by not addressing his pro se motion to withdraw his plea.

The

State does not dispute that the form of defendant's pleadings
communicated his desire to withdraw his plea.

Where defendant

was represented by counsel at the time he filed the pro se
motion, however, the court was under no obligation to consider
it.

The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in

declining to do so.

In any event, because defendant has adduced

no evidence to substantiate the claim on which his motion was
based, it would necessarily have failed on the merits.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WHERE DEFENDANT EXPRESSED IN
WRITING HIS SATISFACTION WITH
COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL, HE CANNOT
NOW FAULT THE COURT FOR IGNORING
HIS EARLIER COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS
COUNSEL; EVEN ON THE MERITS, HIS
COMPLAINT FAILS BECAUSE HE HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED THAT THE COURT'S
ALLEGED ABUSE CAUSED HIM HARM
A. Defendant invited the claimed error by asserting
different positions in the trial court and on appeal.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to inquire into his complaints about his counsel's
representation.

See Br. of Aplt. at 19. This argument fails

because defendant invited the very error of which he now
complains.

Where defendant expressed in writing his satisfaction

with his attorney and explicitly agreed that he wanted to proceed
with imposition of sentence, he cannot now argue that the court
should have considered the complaints that preceded his letter of
approval.
"The doctrine of invited error ^prohibits a party from
setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on
appeal.'"

State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App.

1991)(quoting State v. Henderson. 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash.
1990)); accord State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to discourage a
defendant in a criminal case from inviting prejudicial error and
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then implanting it in the record "as a form of appellate
insurance against an adverse sentence."

State v. Parsons, 781

P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989); accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220
(noting the rule "discourages parties from intentionally
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for
reversal on appeal").
In this case, the day after entering his guilty plea,
defendant filed two pro se motions requesting replacement of his
court-appointed attorney.1

R. 126, 127-30.

At a subsequent

hearing at which he was still represented, defendant requested
and was granted a continuance to allow him to retain private
counsel.

R. 135.

The law is clear that when a defendant expresses
dissatisfaction with his representation,
the court must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of
the defendant's complaints and to apprise
itself of the facts necessary to determine
whether the defendant's relationship with his
or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to
the point that sound discretion requires
substitution or even to such an extent that
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel
would be violated but for substitution.

1

Early in the case, defendant had orally moved the trial
court to remove and replace his first court-appointed public
defender. R. 76. The court interpreted this request as an
assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Different
counsel appeared at the next hearing, and the court thereafter
recognized him as defendant's legal representative. See R. 79.
6

State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987) (citation
omitted); accord State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, 3 13, 27
P.3d 573.

In this case, the record does not reveal any immediate

effort by the court to explore defendant's complaints beyond the
grant of a continuance for defendant to seek private counsel.
Two months later, before sentencing, defendant wrote a
letter to the court, copied to defense counsel, in which he
dispelled any concerns about the effectiveness of his courtappointed counsel:
I am writing you in regards to the case as
above. For some time I experienced major
anxiety concerning my plea. This as I [sic]
could not believe that the mere use of drugs
could carry such a heavy penalty. I believe
my attorney . . . has counseled me correctly.
Not only as regards the court/legal
penalties, but also to my health.

Please accept my apology to the Court for the
trouble I have caused. . . . I will accept
any treatment, supervision, or consequences
Your Honor deems necessary.
R. 139.

This letter of support for his counsel's representation

unequivocally negated defendant's earlier expressions of
dissatisfaction.

A trier of fact, reading such a letter, could

conclude only that defendant's earlier concerns about his courtappointed legal representative had been resolved.
Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the following exchange
occurred:
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The Court:

Okay, [defendant] is back.
Where we at, [defense
counsel]?

Def. Cnsl:

He's decided he wants to go
ahead with sentencing, Your
Honor.

The Court:

Is that the case, [defendant]-

Defendant:

Yes.

The Court:

— that's what we're doing?
Okay.

R. 212: 2.2

Defendant's explicit decision to go ahead with

sentencing confirms that any concerns he had previously expressed
with regard to his counsel's representation had been effectively
allayed.

To argue on appeal that the court abused its discretion

by proceeding to sentencing without considering defendant's early
complaints about his attorney ignores both defendant's subsequent
expression of confidence in his attorney and his explicit
acquiescence to sentencing.

Because defendant's conduct in

writing to the court and agreeing to proceed with sentencing led
the court into the very error he now asserts, his claim should be
rejected.3

Perdue, 813 P.3d at 1205; Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285.

2

The beginning of this interchange seems to suggest that
the proceedings had been temporarily adjourned, pending a
discussion between counsel and client. A careful review of the
tapes of the morning's proceedings, however, reveals no such
antecedent event.
3

Moreover, defendant's position on appeal is fundamentally
inconsistent with the position he asserted at trial. For this
reason as well, the Court may decline to consider it. See, e.g.,
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 1994) (quoting State
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987))(inconsistent
position taken in trial and appellate courts "smacks of invited
8

B.

Defendant failed to establish prejudice.

Even on the merits, defendant's argument fails because his
attorney's representation accorded with his wishes, even if it
did not produce the result for which defendant hoped.

Assuming

arguendo that the trial court did not engage in the necessary
"efforts" to determine the merits of defendant's early
complaints, the Court should find that any error was harmless.
That is, any abuse of discretion by the court in failing to
further explore the nature of defendant's early complaints did
not prejudice defendant because defense counsel actively
represented him in precisely the way in which he repeatedly
demanded and because defendant has not shown that the documents
he sought would have substantiated his claim of mental illness.
Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and dismiss the case while he was represented by counsel. R.
149-51.

At the same time, he wrote to the court, stating that

defense counsel should investigate his mental health records and
requesting that the court not sentence him until such
investigation had been completed.

R. 154-55.

In accord with defendant's wishes, defense counsel moved to
discover defendant's mental health records.4

R. 160. When that

error, which is ^procedurally unjustified and viewed with
disfavor'").
4

The pro se pleadings filed after defendant acknowledged
the competency of his counsel mainly address the need for counsel
to investigate defendant's mental health records prior to
sentencing. See R. 154-55, 178, 188, 190. Such investigation,
9

action failed to produce a timely response, counsel filed a
motion to compel.

R. 171.

The court also acknowledged

defendant's request by continuing sentencing so that his counsel
could "obtain the defendant's mental health records from the
prison so a determination can be made as to whether or not to
proceed with sentencing" (R. 158). The court then granted
multiple continuances, awaiting the mental health records. R.
163, 169, 174, 176, 181.

Finally, six months later, defense

counsel received the records.

The minute entry of the next

status hearing states: "[Defense counsel] has received the
information regarding the defendant's mental health from the Utah
State Prison. [Defense counsel] indicates that he will not be
filing a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" (R. 183). The only
reasonable inference to be drawn from this entry is that
defendant's mental health records provided no evidentiary support
for defendant's claim that his plea was not knowing or voluntary.
Because defense counsel sought and received the very
documents on which defendant's complaint about him was based,

defendant surmised, would substantiate his claim that mental
illness prevented him from entering a knowing and voluntary plea
and that the court, accordingly, should have permitted him to
withdraw it. Defense counsel was, in fact, doing exactly what
defendant had requested, although he perhaps did not personally
communicate his activity as well as defendant would have liked.
See R. 160, 171. Thus, the crux of defendant's complaint is
really not that his counsel failed to represent his interests,
but that he did not adequately communicate with defendant in the
course of his competent representation.
10

defendant has wholly failed to establish either that his counsel
should have been replaced or that he would have enjoyed a better
outcome absent his counsel's representation.

See State v.

Valencia, 2001 UT App. 159, f 14, 27 P.3d 573 (finding that any
inadequacy in the inquiry into indigent defendant's
dissatisfaction with counsel was harmless where good cause did
not require substitution of counsel); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) ("Any
error . . . which does not affect the substantial rights of a
party shall be disregarded'7) . Absent any showing by defendant
that his mental health records would have provided evidentiary
support for his claim that mental illness prevented him from
entering a knowing and voluntary plea, his claim fails.
POINT TWO
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING
TO DIRECTLY ADDRESS HIS PRO SE
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to
consider his pro se pleadings and letters, which he maintains
constituted "a valid motion to withdraw his guilty plea" (Br. of
Aplt. at 13). The State does not dispute that the form of
defendant's pleadings sufficed to communicate his desire to
withdraw his plea.

See Lundahl v. Ouinn, 2003 UT 11, i 4, 67

P.3d 1000 (courts generally lenient with pro se litigants).

The

issue, however, is not the formal sufficiency of the pleadings
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but whether the court had an obligation to consider them on the
merits while defendant was represented by counsel.
The timing of defendant's pro se pleadings is dispositive.
Defendant filed his pro se motion to withdraw his plea and
dismiss the case less than three months after explicitly
affirming the adequacy of his counsel's representation. R. 14951.

Because defendant was represented by counsel at that timef

he "was required to either file motions through his counsel or
seek to dismiss his counsel and proceed pro se." State v.
Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, 1 32, 143 P.3d 302. He did neither.
This court has stated that
[t]he defendant may choose selfrepresentation or the assistance of counsel,
but is not entitled to a ^hybrid
representation' where he could both enjoy the
assistance of counsel and file pro se
motions. The only exception to this rule is
that a defendant may file a pro se motion to
disqualify his appointed counsel.
Id. at 1 33 (citing People v. Serio, 830 N.E.2d 749 (111. App.
Ct. 2005)). See also State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 (Utah
1999) (recognizing that the constitutional right to counsel and
to self-representation are "mutually exclusive" (citing Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21)).
This court's holding in Wareham comports with a majority of
state courts that also disfavor a right to hybrid representation.
See, e.g.. People v. Handy, 664 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (111. App. Ct.
1996)("The trial court correctly ignored defendant's pro
motion . . . Defendant was represented by counsel at all
12

se

pertinent times. Accordingly, defendant had no authority to file
pro

se motions, and the court not only did not need to consider

them, it should not have considered them.'7); State v. Harvey, 713
P.2d 517, 521-22 (Mont. 1986) (holding that trial court correctly
refused to consider defendant's pro se motions because "as long
as defendant was represented by counsel defendant could not act
pro se").

Indeed, some jurisdictions have even adopted explicit

rules that bar represented parties from filing pro se documents.
See U.S. v. Aaofskv, 20 F.3d 866, 872 n.7 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing
rules promulgated in Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho,
New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington).

While Utah has

no explicit rule, this Court's decision in Wareham puts it
directly in line with the nationwide majority on the issue of
hybrid representation.

Because defendant was represented by

counsel when he filed his pro se motion to withdraw his plea, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider
it.5

5

Moreover, the claim fails on the merits because defendant
has not adduced a shred of evidence to substantiate his claim
that mental illness precluded him from entering a knowing and
voluntary plea.
13

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of use of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) with prior convictions, a second degree felony.
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